INTRODUCTION
One would think there is nothing new to say about the First Amendment. The principal lines of doctrine are clear. Government may not suppress or regulate speech because it does not like its content-unless it is obscene or demonstrably defamatory. If government regulates the time, place or manner of speech, it must regulate in a way that does not take sides between competing ideas. And if a government regulation directed at other ends has the effect of restricting speech, that regulation too must be neutral.
Wonderful intricacies arise in working out the details and boundary lines of these doctrines, but the main principles are clear.
Last summer I lectured on American civil liberties law to a group of young lawyers from the former communist countries of Eastern Europe. These doctrines were clear enough that these lawyers could grasp them readily. They resonated so strongly with universal, liberal (that is liberty-loving) intuitions, that these young men and women found the doctrines entirely natural. At first they were a bit startled that our Supreme Court had declared that we cannot punish those who burn our flag, 2 but on reflection they found it thrilling.
So it is with no pleasure that I note that in this country, in classrooms and law reviews, the great liberal ideal of free expres-.sion is under attack. Tyrants have always derided freedom of expression-inspired either by Hitler or Marx and their academic apologists. But as Professor Balkin points out, it had been scholars and activists on the left who worked for the development of First Amendment law. 3 Yet today the theoretical challenge to free speech principles comes from scholars of the left. 4 Since ideas have consequences, and the ideas expressed today in the classrooms and law reviews may tomorrow find their way into judicial opinions, I sound the alarm: to identify and catalogue, to analyze, explain and I hope exorcise this new intellectual attack on liberty. Here, as in a number of other areas, "civic republicanism" is the banner under which this assault on liberty gathers.
A recent article by Professor Owen Fiss of the Yale Law School illustrates this threatening trend. Professor Fiss takes a seemingly uncontroversial premise as his point of departure: The First Amendment's Free Speech Clause was intended to assure the widest possible debate about matters of concern to the community.' It is thus a principal engine of democratic or, if you will, republican participation in government. The error Fiss commits right at the outset is to mistake an effect of the principle for the principle itself. The First Amendment protects a liberty-liberty of expression-and it is an effect of this liberty that there is wide and uninhibited discussion of political matters. Similarly, property rights enable markets and the efficiencies they entail. But property is not respected just because of the effect, economic efficiency; rather the effect follows because property rights are respected in principle.
Because Fiss substitutes the effect of liberty for liberty itself, it seems natural for him to claim that the First Amendment may compel making all important channels of public communication available on the widest possible terms-especially providing them to groups and points of view which are deemed insufficiently audible in the public debate. 7 In a benign application of this substitution of effect for principle, Fiss concludes that it would have been unconstitutional for the National Endowment for the Arts not to fund the famous Mapplethorpe photography exhibit. 8 More startlingly, Fiss argues by analogy to the Prince Edward County case 9 that in extremis a court might order continued funding of the NEA, if Congress chose to reduce its budget to prevent the NEA from making the controversial grant.
The real trouble begins when this conception of the First Amendment is pressed further to deny free speech protection to speakers who wish not to pronounce certain views. The speech-assilence principle has been part of free speech law at least since the flag salute case, West Virginia Board of Education v Barnette'°-which held that it is unconstitutional to compel an unwilling speaker to speak. The protection of this principle has already been denied to broadcasters, who may be compelled to carry programs they deplore." Fiss's argument entails a denial of this protection to newspapers as well. ' 2 Id at 2100-01. 8 Id at 2103-04. [can] require the Supervisors to exercise the power that is theirs to levy taxes to raise funds adequate to reopen, operate, and maintain without racial discrimination a public school system [like] that operated in other counties in Virginia.").
Id at 2105. See Griffin v School Board of Prince Edward County, 377 US 218, 233 (1964) ("[T]he District Court
From this it is but a short step to suppression pure and simple. Civic republicans explain the historic exclusion of obscenity from constitutional protection on the ground that obscenity does not contribute to, but rather degrades, public (republican) discourse. 13 Obscenity law is a puzzle, and scholars may be forgiven for this excursion. But the chickens come home to roost when writers as diverse as Robert Bork 4 and Laurence Tribe 5 would extend this analysis to deny First Amendment protection to flag desecration. And UNESCO's infamous "new information order" is upon us indeed as Catharine MacKinnon, 6 Richard Delgado, 7 Charles Lawrence,' 8 and Mari Matsuda 9 extend this argument to speech that is offensive and insulting to vulnerable, disfavored (and politically mobilized) groups. MacKinnon and those who follow her not only would strip some forms of uncivil discourse of constitutional protection, but, characterizing them as affirmative offenses to constitutional values, they would make these forms of uncivil discourse themselves actionable as denials of constitutional rights. 2 0 Straddling these two lines of argument is, in practical terms, the most important case: campaign finance regulation. This includes regulation of citizens' speech in the name of a "fairer" public debate, government subsidies of "under-financed" views, and compelled speech by broadcasters, all to provide platforms for, or 
I. HISTORY AND THE FIRST AMENDMENT
American free speech law is as much a product of our history as it is a true deduction from valid premises. Its contours are the result of particular struggles and compromises, played out against the background of familiar doctrinal structures in adjacent fields of public and private law. It is also distinctively American. No other nation claims as fierce and stringent a system of legal protection for speech. It is the strongest affirmation of our national claim that we put liberty ahead of other values. We are still relatively free economically, though circumstances have made many qualifications seem inevitable. But in freedom of expression we lead the world. It is regrettable, but not surprising, that from time to time emergencies or passing tactical concerns lead to proposals to deform this achievement. 25 liberty, as in laws against blasphemy and heresy. In modern times" 6 the most constant and menacing manifestation of this disposition invokes the politics of community and equality: a community that politically mobilized agitators seek to impose, and an equality where all are equally subject to the superior authority of some leading class. We have now, as we have had since the time of the Jacobins, a determined band of intellectuals, politicians, and publicists enraged that human material is recalcitrant to their projects to level the condition of all men in the equal service of their particular visions of community. This project is not the pursuit of equality of opportunity, equality before the law, or even the decent instinct to protect all against misery and need. It is the pursuit of equality of results. The partisans of equal subordination to the claims of politics have always been driven to crush what stood in their way: religion, 2 7 talent, property, science, and most of all, liberty.
It is against this background that I see the elaborate recent campus speech codes. 8 As I shall show, it is hard to credit the claim that these codes are necessary to promote academic values of free and civil inquiry against the ill effects of ugly actions directed against minorities and women. It is more illuminating to see a desire to punish those who blaspheme against community. As with all blasphemy, some of the speech provoking these codes is vulgar, despicable and barely coherent, but this anti-blasphemy response also sweeps up speech that is merely heterodox or vivid. 29 The difficult theoretical problems presented by the law's treatment of commercial speech, fraud, deception, assault, solicitation, and conspiracy assist the case for these codes, as does the difficulty of accommodating the right of free expression to other private rights. We know that the argument for free speech includes both speaker and audience. It encompasses a speaker's attempts to gain his audience's attention, and thus extends beyond the right to reach a willing audience." 0 What of the potential listener who in some circumstances does not wish to give her attention, or, having given it, wishes to withdraw it? No theory of free speech allows a speaker to pursue his audience into her home, break down her door and unstop her ears. Time, place, and manner restrictions-content neutral-may allow the proper regime of accommodation. But the harassment debate gives this problem a new twist. Are there not settings-the workplace or its analogues: a cafeteria, a hospital, or the campus where one lives and works at getting an education-where a listener is only willing to lend his attention to speech that observes certain limits of decorum and civility? And, if so, are these limits completely captured by traditional time, place, and manner limits? Do these limits not refer to content as well? Some such limits have been acknowledged ab omnibus et ubique. But they depend on legal structures, particularly those relating to property rights that are conventional and therefore manipulable. This is apparent in the ebb and flow of decisions about picketing and leafletting in shopping malls and parking lots.
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I despair of providing a theoretical basis for free speech that is at once true and elegant. By true I mean that it covers all, and only, those cases that we conclude the First Amendment should cover. By elegant I mean that the theory is a method of analysis that may be used to generate doctrine, rather than a compendium of ad hoc doctrines. However, this is not to say that philosophy and deep political principles cannot illuminate, judge, justify, and constrain legal doctrine. An examination of philosophical and political principles can improve our general understanding of the law and provide insights into the proper foundation of free speech theories. 
II. FOUNDATIONAL PRINCIPLES
In an important article, Thomas Scanlon points out that philosophical speculation may establish the foundations of a particular topic; for instance the proper measures and limits of distributive justice, the notion of sexual or personal privacy, the propriety of blaming an actor for certain results he causes, or the nature and status of the claim to freedom of expression. 3 He calls the conclusions we reach at this level foundational. 4 They need not be formulated with a mathematical rigor that permits unequivocal applications to the range of concrete circumstances. When we survey those concrete circumstances, we may get a rough idea of how a particular society would look if it embodied the foundational principles. He calls this realization of foundational principles in concrete circumstances the level of policy." Between the foundational and the policy levels stands the level of rights that we recognize in order to approximate these principles in the real world. 6 I have made a similar argument, that "the artificial reason of the law" 37 is necessary to make concrete the abstract, general reflections of philosophy. Philosophy may determine the general orientation of our judgments, but it cannot supply the machinery by which those judgments are instantiated by the law in actual social systems. 3 Freedom of expression is properly based on autonomy: the Kantian right of each individual to be treated as an end in himself, an equal sovereign citizen of the kingdom of ends with a right to the greatest liberty compatible with the like liberties of all others. 4° Autonomy is the foundation of all basic liberties, including liberty of expression. There are famous difficulties in defining these spheres of liberty against encroachment by the actions of others-one man's liberty is another's constraint-and many have despaired of deriving any practical conclusions from this principle as it relates to laws bearing on conduct. But the way is much clearer with respect to thought, expression and persuasion. There the claim to liberty runs directly to the foundational. Our ability to deliberate, to reach conclusions about our good, and to act on those conclusions is the foundation of our status as free and rational persons. No conviction forced upon us can really be ours at all. Limits may be put on my actions insofar as my actions impinge on others, but my status as a rational sovereign requires that I be free to judge for myself what is good and how I shall arrange my life in the sphere of liberty that the similar spheres of others leave me.
4 1 I cede authority to the state to draw the necessary concrete boundaries between our respective spheres of action. But no such necessity requires, indeed self-respect forbids, that I cede to the state the authority to limit my use of my rational powers. That is why lying, while not the most damaging offense to another's moral right, is one of the clearest. 4 41 We should not confuse this Kantian definition of autonomy with a completely different notion: the subjectivity of the good. To claim, as Kantians do, that the moral value of the good depends on its being freely chosen and that therefore the capacity to choose is primary, does not imply at all that there are no objective criteria of the good, or that the good is whatever is chosen, nor yet some thesis about the subjectivity of values. Rather, the pressing problems center around government restrictions on speech by others. Indeed, some of the cases in which government might be seen as acting on the Kantian principle-punishing false or misleading speech, or speech designed to circumvent rational evaluation-are just those in which free speech objections to government interference are typically made, though not always successfully. The paradigmatic free speech case is one in which government prevents a person from speaking or punishes him for having spoken-presumably to deter such speech in the future.
The Constitution is concerned only with limits on government, even though a person's autonomy may be assaulted as much if an employer, a neighbor or a family member silences him or stops his access to speech. Other legal norms take care of non-governmental offenses. The background system of private rights goes a long way toward vindicating free speech rights against private actors. John may not interfere with Jane's decision to publish Bill's letter in her newspaper. But neither may Bill complain if Jane decides she does not want to publish that letter. It is her newspaper. I may say what I want at a gathering in my own home, but I have no right to invade your home in order to give a speech there. Free speech values are preserved in this process because of the neutrality of these or- [59:225 dinary background systems of tort, property and criminal law. 4 7 Perhaps this is why for a long time no one thought to apply constitutional free speech analysis to the law of defamation-unlike criminal libel, where the First Amendment always was thought to apply-until the misuse of that cause of action by the Alabama state police forced latent problems into the open. 48 This is also why commentators have not drawn into question laws against fraud and assault: they protect private rights, and often at the instance of a private party, not the state.
Is this simply an adventitious division of function between constitutional law and common and statutory law? Or is there something foundational (in Scanlon's sense) about protection against the government in the free speech area that makes it the proper and sole focus of constitutional limitations? In Max Weber's formula, government represents the monopoly of organized force of the community, that from which there is no escape, the final authority. 49 (Of course there may be powerful groupings in a territory, and sometimes it is these groupings and not the state that have the last word. But that is a pathological condition-at least in a context where state and law and a constitution count for something. 5 0 If gangs of thugs or warring sects generally predominate over regular authority, then we do not have the context of law or the state at all. And if we do have a state, then the influence of private powers in principle is not inescapable.) The state has the power, for instance, to tax the powerful and redistribute wealth so that new, competing centers of power might grow up. But this is not just a definitional matter. It is fundamental because, as Kant, Rousseau, Locke, and Hobbes each in his own way saw, the state is the only entity to which we delegate this ultimate coercive authority over ourselves. In contractual agreements with "I Here is what Sunstein's critique, 59 U Chi L Rev at 263 (cited in note 23) misses.
These background systems are indifferent-blessedly-to the ideological uses to which their beneficiaries would put them. Sunstein's "New Deal" for free speech would make room for systematic manipulation of these background systems to favor their use for "virtuous," "republican" speech. fellow citizens we make and dissolve arrangements, but we acknowledge in the state a power over us whose authority we may not ignore-except by revolution. To see this aspect of inescapability, consider the case of a municipal ordinance limiting speech and compare it to blacklisting by a major national media network. The first seems eminently escapable, the latter is everywhere in the national territory. But even that extreme contrast does not quite work. The government, even a municipal government, can make laws to control the broadcast network, and these laws will be effective within its territory; if it may not, that is only because the municipality is subject to another government. In short, the state is different. The state is the law, and the law is final-even when the law appears in the humble guise of a municipal ordinance. That is why our constitutionalism has built into the law a protection for certain fundamental rights against law (the state).
The Constitution protects primarily against state silencing of private speech because silencing is distinctive. Silencing invokes the power of the state against both speaker and audience. It stops both mouth and ears. It prevents a transaction between citizens. Classic free speech law privileges speech transactions between citizens as none of the state's business. We acknowledge the state's authority over us in all sorts of situations, but by silencing, the state is asking us to acquiesce in sovereignty over our minds, our rational capacities. That is a deeper kind of subordination than one which at least leaves us free to judge that what the state has done is wrong.
In the case in which the audience does not care to receive the communication, the offense to autonomy is harder to identify. At its limit, where no injury is done to others by the unwanted speech, silencing offends a pure autonomy interest: a right to act (here, speak) where there is no harm to others. But cannot the frustration of the audience's wish that the speaker be silent constitute a kind of harm to it? Perhaps, but not one that should be cognizable in law. It is central to the idea of a fundamental right to liberty that no one should curtail (or ask the state to curtail) the liberty of another when the only reason is disagreement about another's conception of the good. State regulation of unwelcome expression is the punishment of pure ideas or beliefs-the outlawing of having ideas or beliefs, or of letting people know that you have 5 1 This injustice is related, but not identical, to that done in the communicative case. We derive them both from the notion that in a free, just society (a liberal society) no one may be compelled to adopt or to deny any particular theory of the good (although he may be compelled to act on such a theory when communal action is otherwise warranted). This concept of justice limits what we may do to punish unilateral expression and what we may do to forbid communications that may convince an audience to modify its conception of the good.
Private impositions and limitations differ fundamentally from state impositions. First, they issue from the limiting person's own exercise of liberty: the newspaper does not wish to carry my op-ed piece, the private university does not wish to include my intellectual system in its course of study. Second, these limitations derive from other private rights that the limiter might have: rights to privacy, or more commonly, rights to property. A liberal society acknowledges private domains in part to allow the development of individual conceptions of the good. 5 2 If another individual can invoke the power of the state to override that dominion it is likely to be an illiberal claim of authority by the state to adjudicate between two persons' conceptions of the good. Even a judgment by the state that it would be good for you to hear a speech you do not agree with while you are in your own private space is an illiberal assertion of authority. By contrast, time, place, and manner regulations, which are content-neutral, are not an illiberal assertion of authority, but rather a good faith attempt by the liberal state to adjust zones of privacy without regard to what will be pursued within those zones.
III. POLIING THE TRUTH
The foundational status of the state action doctrine answers other questions about the accepted contours of constitutional free speech doctrine. Expressions of opinion are the paradigms of what 5' Robert Bork argues that there is no difference between the state protecting against a neighbor's smoke pollution and the discomfort that some experience when they believe that their neighbors may be using contraceptives in their marital bedroom. Robert H. Bork, Neutral Principles and Some First Amendment Problems, 47 Ind L J 1, 7-11 (1971). Ignoring the differences in the route and the mechanism by which your burning tires in your backyard and your reading dirty books in your den may occasion distress to your neighbor is a mistake Bork shares with the civic republicans I criticize here. 52 We cannot derive the contours of the private domains from any general moral or political principles. All we can derive is that there be some such domains. See Fried, Is Liberty Possible? at 127 (cited in note 38).
we protect. Free speech cases often explain that " [t] here is no such thing as a false idea." 5 3 But why may the state intervene to prohibit or punish factually false statements? 54 Defamation and deception are actionable wrongs, perhaps on the reasoning I have already offered: they vindicate private rights invoked by, or at least on behalf of, private individuals. 55 But the First Amendment precludes punishment for generalized "public" frauds, deceptions, and defamation.
5 6 In political campaigns the grossest misstatements, deceptions, and defamations are immune from legal sanction unless they violate private rights-that is, unless individuals are defamed.
We should understand the group libel controversy in this light. At common law a group libel is actionable at the instance of a group member only if the generalized libel is adequately pointed and the group sufficiently small so that each member may treat it as the equivalent of an individual defamation. 57 Other liberal societies take a different tack, but one suspects thaf they are doing so for one of two illiberal reasons. Perhaps they are punishing the wickedness of the person who entertains such sentiments and does not have the decency to keep them to himself. Or perhaps they fear that the group libel will change the values and sentiments of the public, much as a political campaign for a Marxist, Nazi or other palpably evil political cause could be seen as an attempt to corrupt public opinion. From the outset in this country we have Hudson & Goodwin, 11 US (7 Cranch) 32 (1812) (holding that there is no federal criminal common law protecting newspaper editors from prosecution under the common-law crime of seditious libel). In this respect our law is distinct from that of other countries-even quite decent liberal ones-which recognize categories of public defamation such as insulting the nation, or the flag, or the head of state. This is why flag desecration laws were so profoundly contrary to the American free speech tradition. generally set our face against such illiberal laws based on such illiberal reasons. 5 s But why do we, along with all liberal nations, treat public deception in a privileged way? Why is there no legal sanction against false accusations against a political program in newspaper editorials? Why may a television commentator misstate the content of a Supreme Court decision or a pronouncement of the President and thereby misinform with impunity? We are familiar with the usual accounts: public debate must be "uninhibited, robust and wideopen, '5 9 and the Meiklejohn thesis that the First Amendment protects all speech which bears on matters on which voters have to make decisions. 6 0 But these accounts seem to announce the conclusion rather than explain why we allow actions for deception and defamation in the private domain but not the public.
The answer must be that in the public domain the state is enforcing a view of the truth about itself. Because it is interested, it cannot be trusted. The public must be left to sort out the truth for itself. Does this mean that the Kantian principle allows a distinction between fact and opinion, at least in principle justifying the imposition of authority in the realm of truth?
We would be willing to delegate to others the task of ferreting out and stopping some forms of deception. However, for' other types of potential deception the risk seems too great to allow this delegation. We would be glad to allow an expert to assure the correctness of food labels, claims for medicines and the accuracy of commercial advertising. Compare this to a scenario where the government prevents or punishes the publication of a scientific paper based on false, unreliable, or fabricated data. (Recall the cold fusion episode.) Our reluctance is much greater. We do not allow the suppression of articles about ill-founded diets, exercise programs, or even schemes for making huge fortunes or never having to pay taxes. Books and magazines of this sort may be sold with impunity; yet our intuitions change drastically if the speaker proposes a commercial transaction in which he sells something other than speech." "' Note the way we can distinguish the two: the legal sanction must attach to the sale of something other than the speech. If a health food store prominently displays crank articles At one end of the spectrum are technical questions on which all reasonable, informed persons would agree. The autonomy principle is only implicated when the government seeks to control speech directed to more general or more abstract issues. With these matters, autonomy prohibits irrevocable delegation of the authority to control access to our minds. The issue of commercial fraud illustrates this spectrum. Most would accept the risk of erroneous fact-finding by properly designated government agencies (courts, juries) as a cost of being able to seek redress against others who have cheated us, even though we know that the government agencies might sometimes punish honest and even accurate speech in the process. Where government's own interests are at stake (as in political discussions and the promotion of candidates), however, we withdraw this delegation because of the inherent conflict of interest. This touches on the autonomy principle's objection to allowing the delegee to control the avenues that might lead to the modification or withdrawal of the delegation.
This brings us to the interesting recent development of constitutional protection for commercial speech, itself a victory for the autonomy principle. The initial extension of free speech rights to commercial speech in Virginia Board of Pharmacy v Virginia Citizens Consumer Council 6 2 was bold and correct. It was not, however, radical. The protection from the outset covered only opinion and true speech." In Linmark Associates, Inc. v Willingboro, Justice Marshall, for a unanimous Court, explained the issue precisely:
The [town, in forbidding the posting of "For Sale" and "Sold" signs] acted to prevent its residents from obtaining certain information .... The [town] has sought to restrict the free flow of this data because it fears that otherwise homeowners will make decisions inimical to what the [town] views as the homeowners' self-interest and the corporate interest of the township . . . . If dissemination of this information can be restricted, then every locality in the country can suppress any facts that reflect poorly on the locality, so long as a plausible claim can be made that disclosure would cause the recipients of the information to act "irrationally." 6 4 about the healing powers of lecithin next to the lecithin rack, it is the sale of the lecithin that can be regulated, not the sale of the magazine. The commercial speech cases recognize the autonomy right to make up one's own mind about a proposal that includes no lies. The justifications offered for restricting truthful commercial speech boil down either to a paternalistic claim to control the judgments of even undeceived citizens or, more accurately, to the capture of governmental power by a self-serving faction of commercial actors seeking to entrench its own economic interests. In brushing past these justifications, the Court was not reinstating Lochner-era control over economic regulation. Instead, the Court recognized free speech values in an area where they had been overlooked, while using Lochner-era arguments to conclude that the state had not met its burden of proof in justifying restrictions on free speech. In pure cases of economic due process like Lochner 6 5 there would be only the Court's economic judgment.
IV. ASSAULT AND WORKPLACE HARASSMENT
The analysis that illuminated the issues of defamation also illuminates the constitutional status of a class of speech that comes closer to the campus speech codes: assaults, threats, and workplace harassment.
6 6 As we have seen, what made the law of defamation tolerable was the limitation to false speech and the government's limited role as arbiter between conflicting invocations of private rights. But now consider cases in which a person threatens another with physical harm.
The law of assault is grounded not in the communication of information (a threat, after all, is not just a statement of fact), but in the physical imposition for which the assault is a preparatory step. " An assault is more like the signal that triggers a criminal act and therefore is punishable as a part of that criminal design. s 68 Another intellectual puzzle, which the law has dealt with by taking it for granted, is the use of speech to further criminal agreements and enterprises, as when words are used to join a conspiracy, to give orders, or to supply instructions in furtherance of some criminal scheme. In all these cases the law has understood that the words are not being used to express an idea or an attitude so much as they serve as signals and actions. I can help you to build a bomb by supplying parts and helping you assemble them or by giving you the in-similar to a blackmail letter, for example, which is not primarily a communication of information or a report of an attitude but more a proposal or consummation of a transaction-like the offer or acceptance of a contract. Sexual harassment of the quid pro quo variety (as opposed to the hostile environment type) has some of this quality: it is not the expression of opinion or statement of fact that is objectionable, but rather the offer to exchange workplace advantages for sexual favors. 9 So it is inapposite to draw analogies between assault and cases of hostile environment harassment or of grave insult-such as in campus hate speech or public flag desecration. The latter are not preparatory to some physical imposition; or if they are, then it is the imposition that makes them wrongful. Instead, what is at work in such cases is the use of speech to cause emotional distress.
Remember that conveying information is not all there is to the free expression principle. Insults may contain a point of view that the speaker is entitled to express and his audience to hear. "Strong and effective extemporaneous rhetoric cannot be nicely channeled in purely dulcet phrases. An advocate must be free to stimulate his audience with spontaneous and emotional appeals .... , 0 And if the audience is the object of the insult, the speaker's interest in expression still supplies half of the privilege, which is enough to prevail. Certainly the privilege can't be overcome by the victim's interest in remaining unaware of the speaker's low opinion of him. Hence the difference between receiving harassing phone calls or being bombarded by invective on the street or at work, and the scenario in which one receives a single letter containing the substance of these views. We are not inclined to protect a person against the knowledge of another's bad opinion. Instead, it is the intrusion that is the basis for sanction.
Intrusion embodies the notion of countervailing right. You may not give a political speech in my living room against my will, structions to make the bomb. All this falls outside the bounds of First Amendment protection, but the boundaries may be fuzzy and a sophisticated manipulator of ideas may make something that is squarely in one category look like it is also in the other. But we need not be fooled. For a discussion of the appropriateness of a prior restraint preventing publication of the technical information necessary to build a bomb, see Note, United States v. [59:225 because for quite neutral reasons I have a property/privacy interest in my home. It might also be argued that I have a right to pass along the street without being pursued by unwanted invective. The harAsser in this setting is as much an intruder on my privacy as the beggar who corners me on a lonely subway platform. 71 A rule against this sort of harassment is a time, place, and manner restriction, a content-neutral notion that protects against non-consensual intrusions upon one's right to be in a public or other place in relative tranquility. This is much easier to see with respect to workplace harassment: the workplace is not quite your home, but neither is it speakers' corner in Hyde Park. For reasons that are quite content-neutral the law might assign me a right to limit the intrusions I must endure at work to those that relate to my work.
The same is true of a college dormitory and some parts of a campus. People should no more be free to pursue me into my dormitory than into my apartment house lobby. 72 This analysis also explains the doctrines about public fora and limited public fora, 73 doctrines that may be seen as attempts to adjust conflicting rights of speakers and the private rights of property owners, audiences, and bystanders. This institutional adjustment implicates a further institutional principle: restrictions on freedom of expression, if they are to be justified by invocation of some proper governmental purpose (such as protecting countervailing private rights), must be content-and viewpoint-neutral. It is not obvious that this crucial institutional device is a direct manifestation of foundational values. After all, if the government forbids cross burning 7 4 but not flag burning, the silencing would seem to be as good or as bad, regardless of whether someone else is also silenced. But in fact content-neutrality is the First Amendment's version of a crucial device deployed throughout law to enforce adherence to principle where good purposes are invoked to justify actions that have bad effects. To look only at constitutional law, we require that where legislation makes racial dis- tinctions, it be narrowly tailored to a permissible and weighty government purpose; 7 5 where Congress conditions a federal grant to a state on the state's acceptance of the federal "request" that it adopt a federal policy in an area traditionally reserved to the state (such as the regulation of alcohol), the grant may not be conditioned in a way that is under-or over-inclusive relative to its proper purpose;" and uncompensated exactions of property rights from private owners in return for regulatory permissions are valid only if the condition bears a sufficiently close relation to the regulatory purpose. 77 In all of these cases the law assures that important values are not transgressed under the pretext of serving other ends, or even that they not be lightly (though honestly) sacrificed to those other ends. 7 8 Where the values trenched upon are less weighty, all the law requires is a rational relation to a permissible governmental goal. But no one suggests that the government can so easily justify infringements on free expression.
In some contexts this mix of foundational commitments and their somewhat untidy expression at the institutional level of doctrine would be acceptable and reasonable, and no great commotion would ensue. But the controversy over campus hate speech and the (over)reaction of some institutions has put such common sense accommodations under great pressure. Away from such pressures one would recognize the contingent and even arbitrary nature of some of the lines we must draw to adjust these conflicting rights. That is the nature of legal (institutional) protection for abstract (background) rights and values.
V. CAMPUS SPEECH CODES
If only minor intrusions were at stake it would not have been difficult or controversial to work out a set of rules that marked a person's private (or semi-private) space and condemn incursions . O'Connor argues that attaching a condition to highway fund grants such that a portion of a grant to a particular state will be withheld if that state allows alcohol to be sold to minors is underinclusive because it does not address the lion's share of the problem (adults between twentyone and thirty), and over-inclusive because it stops teenagers from drinking even when they would not be driving.
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Nollan v California Coastal Commission, 483 US 825, 834-35 (1987) . 78 This is the law's version of the moral principle of the law of double effect, which suggests that it is more than an institutional device, albeit an important and pervasive one. upon it. But a look at some of the campus speech codes that universities developed in the wake of a widespread campaign for them suggests that the regulators have bigger game in their sights.
Regulations at Michigan, Stanford, Wisconsin 9 and other schools° go beyond protecting the privacy of those who work and live in their midst. The University of Michigan regulations, for instance, condemn speech in the classroom, on bulletin boards, in campus fora, in school newspapers and in mailings that stigmatizes or victimizes an individual on the basis of race, ethnicity, religion, sex, sexual orientation, creed, national origin, ancestry, age, marital status, handicap or Vietnam-era veteran status, and that ... [c] reates an intimidating, hostile, or demeaning environment for educational pursuits, employment or participation in University sponsored extra-curricular activities."' What is condemned here is the content of the speech-not the trespass on the space of a reluctant audience which should find some conventional precinct of tranquility.
The ideas the universities condemn are false and offensive, but the universities do not condemn all false and offensive ideas. For example, an invective condemning the United States as an oppressor nation or condemning capitalism as a form of exploitation may be repeated with impunity. The same impunity would extend to invectives directed against students and professors seen as agents, apologists or running dogs of an oppressor nation and of capitalism. Individuals within the community may not espouse some forms of race and gender superiority, but may espouse others. Individuals may advocate Marxism and the most extreme forms of militant feminism. And none of these codes would condemn burning the American flag, even to affront a gathering of veterans or the widows and orphans of soldiers killed in battle. The universities condemn ideas as such: individuals may not express certain views in the way they believe most likely to attract an audience, though precisely the same forms of expression may be used to convey ideas and sentiments less provocative to locally protected sensibilities. This discrimination makes clear that those who promulgate these regulations assign to themselves the authority to determine which ideas are false and which false ideas people may not express as they choose. Breaches of courtesy and good manners may be akin to breaches of content-neutral time, place, and manner regulations, but the benign claim that these regulations simply seek to produce a more courteous community is belied by the fact that not all breaches of courtesy and good manners fall under the ban. Indeed some of the proponents of these codes scorn the idea of content neutrality. 2 The ban is an exercise of power. It shows who is boss. Thus the holders of noxious ideas are suppressed and the rest of the community is impressed and intimidated by this display of political might.
Thomas Grey, one of the drafters of the Stanford code, provides vivid confirmation of my thesis in a short article explaining and justifying that code. 8 3 He is an evidently decent, reasonable man, quite committed to liberal free speech principles. He begins by acknowledging, as do I, that "civility and courtesy in manner of speech can be required in the classroom from teachers and students alike." 8 4 I would go further and acknowledge a title to enforce such norms beyond the classroom-in the student unions, dining halls, dormitory meeting rooms and other common places of the university. But Grey is unwilling to enact any such "requirement" in order to deal with the incidents we all deplore. He states without explanation at the outset of his article: "[T]his value is not best pursued by coercive disciplinary regulations of campus-wide application. [59:225 piece, and in another connection, he provides his answer. He concludes that the code he helped draft is asymmetrical in the following sense. In those unhappy moments when the contemporary campus becomes a multi-cultural armed camp, the Stanford regulation would prevent me from firing my most powerful verbal assault weapons across racial, sexual, or sexual preference lines. By contrast, people of color, women, and gays and lesbians can use all the words they have at their disposal against me. This result seems an impermissible failure of viewpoint neutrality to some civil libertarians.
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This asymmetry would seem to be a defect-an injury not only to traditional free speech principles of content-and viewpoint-neutrality, but also to the value of civility. That something not quite wholesome is going on here is evident from the labored justification Grey offers for the code's conceded lack of viewpoint and content neutrality. Not only does Grey reject general campus civility codes, he also rejects disciplinary rules based on such "traditionally recognized exceptions to full First Amendment protection like 'defamation,' 'fighting words,' or speech that constitutes 'intentional infliction of emotional distress.' ,,87 These latter grounds for regulation might sweep into their net false or unsubstantiated charges of racism or sexism and epithets used against males, whites, or heterosexuals. That is precisely why Grey rejects such grounds of regulation in favor of an analogy to cases brought under Title VII, s8 where the claim is that the employer who allows derogatory epithets creates a work envi- (1988) . But the Falwell decision held that the First and Fourteenth Amendments prohibit public figures from recovering damages for the tort of intentional infliction of emotional distress in the absence of a showing that a publication contained a false statement of fact made with "actual malice"-a standard of proof adopted in "recognition of the fundamental importance of the free flow of ideas and opinions on matters of public interest and concern." Id at 50. ronment more hostile to women and minorities and thus discriminates against them in providing employment opportunities. The analogy is labored, and surprisingly so given the less troublesome and closer analogies that Grey has at hand but rejects. First, the one Supreme .Court case cited to support the analogy did not discuss the First Amendment in reviewing a district court's failure to consider a woman's claim that her employer had sexually discriminated by allowing the creation of a workplace environment hostile to female employees. 8 9 More analytically, the hostile environment cases assume that the employer has both the common law right and the ability to guard against offensive conditions for all of his employees. The employer violates Title VII because of the deficient exercise of his authority (and common law duty) to provide a reasonably dignified work environment for all of his employees. Stanford is not in the position of the Congress of the United States, which passes anti-discrimination laws against the background of state law employment rights and obligations. Its position is rather analogous to the employer who is assumed to be entitled to enforce civility generally-an authority Grey declines to exercise-and who is faulted for failing to enforce it in the one respect which is, by virtue of the Fourteenth Amendment, a subject of federal congressional concern.
Is it unreasonable for me to conclude that one who shrinks from banning from the campus extreme and distressing verbal abuse generally, but will punish insults directed at "blacks, Latinos or gays," 90 seems more interested in making a political statement and showing political solidarity than in protecting the civility of discourse in the academic community? If you think me churlish in hinting at mauvaise foi where I have demonstrated no more than faulty reasoning, then I ask you to consider what Grey offers in reply: Those, like me, who seek symmetry, content-and viewpointneutrality, are guilty of preaching "the Plessy 9 " doctrine" of separate-but-equal 92 rejected in Brown v Board of Education.
9 3 But here Grey begs the question ferociously. Whether Grey likes it or not (and I suppose he dislikes it very much), there are grounds for saying that modern constitutional doctrine rejects separate-but-equal in order to embrace the principle of colorblindness first stated in the Plessy dissent, 9 4 and the grounds are at least as good as those for saying that modern constitutional doctrine endorses the "asymmetry" that moves Grey and his fellow campus Solons. 95 As you sow, so shall you reap. The result of the kind of asymmetry Grey celebrates is campuses where people falsely deploy raucous charges of racism and sexism not only with impunity but with a fair chance of bringing down censure. Not only does this diminish academic discourse; the reputation of the academy as the haven of free and open discourse also suffers. The sophistries used to defend the various campus speech codes have made intellectuals and academia the deserved butt of public ridicule. The PC jokes may not be very subtle, but they capture something that really is there.
And what are we to make of the argument, first offered by Catharine MacKinnon 6 and since given at least qualified support by Frank Michelman and Cass Sunstein: 9 7 that some speech must be shut down in the name of free speech because it tends to silence those disparaged by it. MacKinnon does not only make the conventional point that the speech at issue threatens in straightforward ways to drown out or do violence to the victims. 8 If that were the claim, it would come under familiar First Amendment categories-fighting words, incitement to violence, the heckler's veto-and could be evaluated in those terms. No, here it is content that is said to silence, and it purportedly does this silencing by causing the audience-both the group disparaged and others in the audience-to entertain certain false opinions: for example, about the capacities, moral situation, and role of women.
Such an argument runs four-square into one of the two convictions at the very heart of free expression: that adult persons should be free to come to whatever opinions of which they may be convinced. 99 The purported silencing of which MacKinnon complains is a silencing that comes about only if women become convinced that they have no right to speak and if others are convinced that women are not worth listening to. This is an odd kind of silencing. Could the Roman Catholic Church complain, then, that Voltaire's diatribes against it deprive it of religious freedom because the faith of believers might be shaken and the willingness of non-believers to entertain its claims lessened? Is Catharine MacKinnon herself silenced by those who deploy good arguments against her? Are her opponents silenced by her good arguments? Of course, MacKinnon thinks her argument applies only when the better established inveigh against the less well-established. But this is irrelevant. If the better off threaten to use force against the less fortunate, that threat, like any threat of illegal or unjust action, is to be condemned. But arguments address the mind and the emotions; they threaten only persuasion. MacKinnon wants a kind of affirmative action in the realm of discourse, and like Robert Bork, 1 00 ignores the special route by which speech attains its effect. The use of the word silencing here is the kind of when-I-use-words-they-meanwhat-I-say gambit that gives academic discourse a bad name. 11 ' VI. DEBUNKING THE DROWN-OUT THEORY It is but a short step from this line of illiberal reasoning to Owen Fiss's thesis that courts may require the state to subsidize access to the public forum by unpopular, unfamiliar, and illfunded views.' 0 2 Advocates could make the argument in terms of the Meiklejohn thesis of self-government and support for the fullest measure of public controversy, 0 3 but these are not arguments that we can take seriously. I doubt that Fiss would invoke them to claim support for the very ideas MacKinnon and the University of Michigan authorities would shut down. Rather, the idea is that our society has victimized certain groups-some racial minorities, women, homosexuals-and that justice (if not the Constitution) requires compensation in the public forum as well as everywhere else.
To be sure, if government controlled all the resources, then very little would be left of the value of free speech. There are two responses, however, to this concern. First, as classic liberals have always known but socialists have forgotten, a limited government and a vigorous private sector firmly beyond government's reach are crucial to freedom of the spirit as well as to economic liberty. This is the basis of the old saying that liberty is indivisible. Since community control over resources is the light that beckons on the left, the left-to the extent it cares about freedom of the spirit-must seek out devices that will discipline the government's monopoly in the realm of ideas. But any such device must consist of an official arbiter (that is, a government arbiter) to attempt to distribute access to the public forum. And that device cannot be content-neutral. It must decide which views have been heard too much, which not enough, and which should not be heard at all. The only content-neutral device turns out to be a society in which a significant portion of the resources are in private hands and beyond the reach of government altogether.
Redistributive policies generally are quite compatible with this conception. In fact, as Rawls's theory of justice suggests, 1 ' 0 this kind of liberty may be one of the best arguments against gross disparities of income, or at least against serious relative deprivation. But let the income distribution be as equal as you please, if a large portion of speech is in private hands, then, on a version of Robert Nozick's Wilt Chamberlain argument, 05 a lot of those resources will end up-as a result of private, individual, and independent ,o3 Id at 2101. 104 See John Rawls, A Theory of Justice § § 12, 13, 32 (Harvard, 1971) . 105 In Anarchy, State, and Utopia, Robert Nozick demonstrates how liberty justly upsets patterns of equality, arguing that there is nothing unjust about an end-state distribution of resources that may favor one citizen over another (in this case, Wilt Chamberlain, as a result of his athletic prowess), at least where the initial distribution of resources was relatively equal and all income transfers occurred through voluntary transactions. See Robert Nozick, Anarchy, State and Utopia 161-64 (Basic, 1974) .
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choices-supporting the "wrong" speech, and "worthy" speech may be heard hardly at all. Once this occurs, the civic republican arguments we hear today about the corruption of the media and the degraded state of public discourse would be heard again.
Considering the facts of the American world, the whole drownout thesis is patently absurd. It simply is not the case that no one will publish unpopular views. Information technology is so far advanced that it takes relatively small capital-capital that almost anyone can assemble-to put out one's message in print form. One need only listen to the news and information programming of public broadcasting to hear the broadest array of opinions-with opinions on the left generously represented. If raw, uninterrupted, uninterpreted public affairs reporting is your thing, it is possible in most large cities to overdose on twenty-four hours a day of one or evei two C-SPAN channels. Mini-dish satellite broadcasting will reach the humblest home in the most rural setting-as it does already in Europe and parts of the Third World. 1 0 6 So what in the world are these people talking about? They cannot literally mean that their messages are drowned out in the sense that those who wish to hear them cannot. It is not as if the networks or The Wall Street Journal were actually jamming the broadcasting of anyone's views. What these people really mean is that not many people are interested; or are not interested for long; or, like myself, if interested are not at all persuaded. In this respect these critics are like annoying children who whine at their parents, "you're not listening to me," when what they mean is, "however much I go on, you don't think I'm right." This whining is dressed up in the self-serving jargon of false consciousness, domination, and cultural hegemonism-a jargon picked up from apologists for Marxism-Leninism-all of which is intended to show how the vulgarity of the competing media is at fault for causing people to ignore the left's more weighty message. What this comes to, of course, is that what some on the left have to say is so boring or so unconvincing that people would rather watch Wheel of Fortune. But is that really Wheel of Fortune's fault?
In the end the "drown-out" forced-access thesis is really just a version of fancy arguments that are designed to justify silencing the opposition. What we have is an argument for censorship-this time to avoid the competition, in much the spirit that East European television used to jam Western broadcasts of "Dallas. is worse: by forcing newspapers to carry articles they do not want and by forcing networks to carry programming that the public will not buy, political entrepreneurs are once more flexing their muscles.
Forced programming is not so much a way of getting a message to the public (the public will probably tune out), as it is a way of showing off power by hoisting flags on other people's flagpoles. The West Virginia Board of Education could not have imagined that by getting Jehovah's Witnesses to salute the flag' 0 7 they were instilling patriotism in them. Instead they were showing off their power by ramming their conception of patriotism down the schoolchildren's throats. This instinct of the civic republican to assert the primacy of community by ramming beliefs and values down people's throats is thus the positive version of the negative instinct to punish those who would speak thoughts the community abhors. Neither compelled professions of faith nor the punishment of blasphemy really seeks to convince; both seek to assert that great communitarian principle: the primacy of politics.
